Abstract
Introduction
In 2007 the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) proclaimed that '...the orderly and efficient use of public funds and resources constitutes one of the essential prerequisites for the proper handling of public finances and the effectiveness of the decisions of the responsible authorities'. 1 In most democracies, the Auditor General's role in the auditing of public sector financial reports is one of the principal elements used by Parliaments in safeguarding public finances and for assisting in providing an assurance of executive accountability and transparency. Indeed, the 1992
Western Australian Royal Commission into the Commercial Activities of Government and Other
Activities (more commonly known as the 'WA Inc' Royal Commission) described the Auditor General's role as providing 'the public's first check and best window on the conduct of government', and as 'a critical link in the accountability chain between the public sector, and the Parliament and the community.
It alone subjects the practical conduct and operations of the public sector as a whole to regular, independent investigation and review'. 2 In order to adequately fulfil this role, the Auditor General must be independent of the organisations he or she audits. Such independence includes separation (preferably supported by legislation) from the executive government, a point also highlighted in the 2007 INTOSAI declaration quoted above.
Notwithstanding the importance of this independence, it is of relatively recent origins. Those responsible for early to mid-nineteenth century public sector audit operated in what would today be considered an unacceptable environment with very little independence from the executive arm of government and certainly without any legislative 'guarantees'. For instance, Funnell (1994:177) has demonstrated that the state auditor in Britain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries:
...was not independent of the executive in any practical or real sense, but was a subordinate executive department which carried out audits for the executive. Audits were for the purpose of detecting fraud and to encourage honesty in dealings with government departments.
In this context, the colonial auditor's role in early to mid-nineteenth century Australia was identical to that of ensuring 'traditional' accountability, with the focus on regular fiscal transactions and compliance with legal requirements and administrative policies by a 'bureaucrat who has been given the authority to discharge a particular function as an expression of hierarchically ordered legal responsibilities' (Carino, 1991:46) . Examination of the history of public sector audit in Australia reveals that the first colonial auditors followed a similar model and were also far from independent, essentially operating as part of the executive administration (Bowyer, 1966:10-14; Di Francesco, 1999; Longhurst, 1995:9; Scripps, 2006:13; Yule, 2002:6) .
Additionally, audit independence in the often isolated colonies was further conflicted because a lack of human and other resources frequently forced local colonial heads of government to allocate multiple roles and responsibilities to individuals. The priority of colonial auditors in this period has been described as providing 'a competent accounting function for the colonial administration' rather than 'a rigorous check on the propriety of the Governor's expenditure': the function of colonial audit 'was not distinguished from the responsibilities of the executive' (Di Francesco, 1999:44) . It was not until the 1870s and 1880s, well after the establishment of Parliamentary systems in the Australian colonies, that the idea of independent audit of government administrative and financial management systems began to be argued for as a necessary part of democratic government.
3
In this paper, we seek to explore the colonial audit role and consider the extent to which the apparent lack of public financial misconduct in the Swan River Colony was due to the early establishment of financial management systems that included public audit, or to the good fortune that competent and ethical government administrators were available for appointment to the relevant roles.
Between 1808 and 1824, prior to the introduction of a formal colonial audit role, the first Australian colonies on the east coast 4 suffered from mismanagement of government finances (Di Francesco, 1999:44; Longhurst, 1995:5-6; Scripps, 2006:8-11; Yule, 2002:5) . Imperial Government inquiries, implemented at least partly because of concerns about some of these 'damaging financial scandals' (Di Francesco, 1999:44) , led to the implementation of stricter accountability practices (including an audit function and a local check on expenditure) that were expected to improve the management of public finances and ensure 'a competent accounting function' (Di Francesco, 1999:44) .
By the 1820s and 1830s, colonial auditors were playing a significant role in colonial Australian public finance systems -despite a lack of independence, auditors having multiple roles and a merging of audit functions with broader treasury functions. Administrators appear to have accepted that the role of the nonindependent colonial auditor was crucial for effective 'on-site' management of government resources in the early colonies. 5 One reason why colonial auditors were considered an effective tool in managing public finances, despite a lack of independence from executive functions, can be explained in terms of the importance of personal reputation. Watts and Zimmerman (1983) have discussed the importance of commercial audit prior to the introduction of legislative fiat and provide evidence that the early definition of audit independence related to the expectation that discovered breaches would be reported. They also show that auditors had personal incentives to be effective -they were frequently required to provide personal bonds, could be fined for not completing audits in time and, crucially, were likely to have their reputation diminished if there was a lack of performance. In rigidly class conscious early nineteenthcentury England, an individual's reputation was fundamental to their ability to make a living. Job vacancies, particularly for government positions, were filled via nepotism and patronage -relationships were the basis of career advancement. This was no less the case in colonial Australia where the considerably smaller population meant reputation was even more important. In such small communities, everyone would have been known to everyone else and, as with most administrative positions, colonial audit positions were typically granted by the governor or the Colonial Office on the basis of personal recommendation. Such contextual factors help to explain why colonial auditors were considered important in providing control over colonial resources even though they operated as part of the executive. This paper is divided into four sections. In section two, we will briefly examine the early experiences of the eastern Australian colonies in the matter of colonial and Imperial audit in order to provide the historical context faced by Stirling in establishing an administrative framework for the Swan River Colony. In section three we shall examine the actual experience of the Swan River Colony and, in section four, we shall provide some concluding remarks wherein we will address the key themes and our findings.
Colonial Finances -the Eastern Australian Colonial Experience
The early colonial administrations in New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land experienced a series of significant public finance difficulties between 1808 and 1824. These problems famously include the 'Rum Rebellion' of 1808 as well as other issues of mismanagement and misconduct including corruption, embezzlement, fraud, illegal taxation and unauthorised loans of public money to private citizens. 9 Two significant examples of dishonesty in managing public finances by individuals are, firstly, the misappropriation of over £6000 by the head of the New South Wales Commissariat, Frederick
Drennan, for which Governor Brisbane sent Drennan to England in 1822 under arrest (Di Francesco, 1999:44, 58; Parsons, 1992) . Secondly, in Van Diemen's Land, the colonial Naval Officer/Treasurer, Edward Bromley, managed to embezzle an amount equivalent to a quarter of the colony's total annual revenue for 1824 (Di Francesco, 1999:45; Eldershaw, 2011; Scripps, 2006:11) . It appears that neither the existing systems of public financial management nor the personal morality of the persons appointed to the key roles were sufficient to ensure proper accountability for government resources in these colonies in the early 1800s. Initially, the terms of reference concerned the penal nature of the colonies but, by the time J. T. Bigge was appointed to head the inquiry in 1819, the investigation was to extend into 'all the laws regulations and usages of the settlements' (Bennett, 1999 It is interesting to note the ex ante and ex post aspects of the audit process envisioned and the limited nature of Imperial support.
The various governors of New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land were not greatly helped by the instructions, advice and precedents administered by the Imperial Government. The Imperial management of colonial finances was itself complex and cumbersome, and further hindered by the long time-lags in communication between 'home' and the colonies. However, this period saw major evolution in government auditing and in accounting procedures in general. 12 Efforts to improve effectiveness in colonial financial management meant Imperial systems also underwent considerable change during the first three decades of the 1800s. Initially the Imperial Parliament's focus was not on the Australian penal colonies at all, but on other, more lucrative, parts of the British Empire. In 1800, five commissioners were appointed 'for the more effectual examination of accounts of public expenditure for the forces in the West Indies,' 13 reporting to the Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts (Jacob, 1809 Francesco, 1999:44; Longhurst, 1995:6) . Prior to 1822, accounting returns had been forwarded to the Imperial Treasury and Colonial Office, not to the Colonial Audit Office. This reporting relationship and audit process was similar to the local audit arrangements in the Swan River Colony during the first few years of settlement.
Clearly, the early experience of Australia's eastern penal colonies in the management of public finances was one of administrative inefficiencies, complicated by constant development and changes in public audit and financial management roles, and combined with some poor choices of individuals in key financial management roles. Key reforms to improve checks on colonial public finances included the introduction of colonial treasuries and a public auditing role. The early experience in the Swan River Colony, and the extent to which it mimicked the eastern seaboard in order to prevent the issues experienced there, are dealt with in the next section.
The Swan River Colony -1828 to 1835
The Swan River Colony was established in June 1829 but, unlike the earlier Australian colonies,
was not created as a penal colony 19 . It was initially founded as a private settlement with land grants being allocated according to the value of assets imported by settlers. It appears the Imperial decision to form the colony was largely the result of intensive lobbying from, inter alia, Captain James Stirling, then a naval officer on half pay who had explored the Swan River in 1827 and been impressed by the possibilities of the area. The initial Imperial government response to Stirling's proposals was negative, principally because of the cost involved to the government at a time when increasing political attention was being paid to government expenditure. 20 At no point did the Imperial government intend to finance the Swan River Colony beyond the salaries of the official establishment and a grant in aid (Battye, 1924; de Garis, 1981:303 This Imperial parsimony helped to ensure the local colonial administration was well-managed financially.
Indeed, close examination of the original records provides no evidence of serious mismanagement and it is unlikely, in such a small community, that such incidences would have gone unnoticed and unreported.
In contrast to New South Wales and Tasmania, the Swan River Colony was established with a local administrative framework already described and with officers appointed. However, the extent to which this system prevented mismanagement is questionable. Experience elsewhere shows that such frameworks and systems alone did not prevent financial mismanagement -the later Australian colonies experienced financial management difficulties similar to those experienced in New South Wales and Van
Diemen's Land. The early colony of South Australia experienced serious problems with its financial administration despite being founded in 1834, five years after the establishment of the Swan River Colony, and also with an administrative system that included public audit. Additionally, the offices in the Swan River Colony were established by the Imperial government over a very brief two to three month period (between late November 1828 and January 1829) and the rush led to ongoing problems for the local administration. Stirling did not receive detailed directions on how to manage the colony's public finances from the Imperial Government. In fact, the limited instructions Stirling did receive from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, a few weeks prior to sailing, specifically warned him about the lack of established financial systems and made it clear that he was expected to sort it out himself:
As Swan River and the adjacent Territory are not within the limits of any existing Colony, difficulties may easily be anticipated in the course of your proceedings, from the absence of all Civil Institutions, Legislative, Judicial or Financial. Until provision can be made, in due form of Law, for the Government of the projected Colony, the difficulties, to which I refer, must be combated, and will, I trust, be overcome with your own firmness and discretion. 26 Stirling also appointed three officers to the position of Commissioner in 'a Board of Counsel and Audit in the management of the property of the Crown and of public property within the settlement'.
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This Board was initially primarily responsible for valuing the personal property being imported by settlers so that the proper amount of land could be granted -an essential activity. 28 However, the Commissioners were also required to examine the official accounts of the various government offices and provide certifications to Stirling.
Thus was formed the administrative framework to operate at the settlement. Soon after landing in June 1829, Stirling commanded these offices to be opened 'for the despatch of business' on 12 August 1829. 29 The key finance officers in the original financial management framework were Stirling, Peter Brown (the Colonial Secretary/Acting Treasurer) and the three Commissioners of the Board of Counsel and Audit, headed by Captain Mark John Currie. Who, exactly, were these men? All had obtained their positions via the usual system of personal reference, but all were also experienced in government administration. As naval captains, Stirling and Currie had considerable experience in naval accounting processes (the principal systems used in the eastern colonies -see The Instructions which I had the honour to receive on quitting England were so few and general and so much better suited to the commencement of this Settlement than to its present circumstances that on almost every subject I am at a loss to know how to proceed. . It is evident these accounts were not quite as Stirling required. The letter accompanying them notes that new rules would be issued shortly -in the meantime, when transmitting them to Stirling, it would be sufficient for the Board to attach a certificate of examination noting any deficiencies and verifying that proper warrants and receipts had been shown. 35 'The rules which are to be followed in all future cases' were issued by Stirling three days later (27 November 1829) in a memorandum to all government 'departments' (as each office was called, even though most consisted of only one or two men). These detailed instructions required each department to Over time, the audit process became more complex with the adoption, for instance, of approved forms for submitting accounts.
Given that so many of the people involved held more than one office within the system, it would October the previous year, has now been actioned and a warrant is to be transmitted to the Acting Treasurer to deduct the amount from the next sum to be paid to the Storekeeper. 37 What is remarkable is the small size of the error detected -an overpayment of just five shillings and sixpence for eight months payment of an annual salary of at least £200 (the annual salary specified in the Imperial Treasury minute of January 1829). Such detail provides evidence that the concept of personal reputation and the system of close mutual monitoring operated effectively to provide assurance, despite a lack of independence from executive government. The small number of people involved, and the scarcity of financial resources, also meant that any syphoning off of funds and/or supplies would have been obvious and of detriment to all colonists.
Although Stirling was satisfied with the proceedings of the Board, due to its increasing workload he abolished it on 1 July 1831 and separated the work into two new offices: an Auditor's Office and the Commissioners of Crown Lands. 38 Captain Currie was appointed as the first Colonial Auditor, provided with an official salary of £300 per annum and made responsible to the Colonial Office through the Governor. 39 As Colonial Auditor, he was to continue the work of valuing the personal property imported by new settlers. He would also continue to receive from the Secretary at the beginning of each quarter the accounts of all government departments: 'These he is carefully to examine with reference to existing
Regulations and according to the usual mode pursued in Auditing Accounts.' If correct, he was to attach a certificate passing them, lodge one copy with the Registrar of Deeds and Papers and retain the other copy (rather than forward it to the Secretary) until an opportunity arose of transmitting them to Britain. If not found correct, he was to directly communicate with the relevant department to have the errors corrected.
At the end of the first month in each quarter, he was to make a return of accounts passed, those found to be missing vouchers and those not presented for audit. He was also to report any accounts remaining in arrears from any former quarter. Additionally, the Auditor was to take on the responsibility of auditing future government purchases and works. Government purchases were made by tenders and contracts and the departments were required to provide the Auditor with the original notices, tenders, contracts and agreements. The Auditor was to then lodge the documents with the corresponding accounts at the Registrar's Office. Stocktaking duties were also imposed. The Auditor was to require 'all Persons in charge of any Description of Property belonging to the Crown' to provide full accounts regarding these responsibilities. (Bowyer 1966:12) . In February 1832, Brown formally transmitted to Lewis and Currie the lists of civil expenditure. 43 In the same month Stirling wrote to Lewis, acknowledging that he had received instructions from the Imperial Treasury as to how Lewis was to undertake his duties. 44 The practice in the colony of appointing one person to hold more than one office appears to have worked effectively, as shown above, and not resulted in petty corruption despite the significant and selfevident conflict of interest.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has briefly explored a component of the evolution of audit and government accountability in Imperial Britain and, particularly, its application in the early Swan River Colony of Western Australia. We have considered the extent to which the lack of public financial misconduct in the Swan River Colony was due to the early establishment of financial management systems (especially the colonial audit role) that provided, in the context of the era, adequate checks and balances, and also to the fact that 'a few good men' -competent and ethical government administrators -were appointed to the relevant roles.
The Lieutenant-Governor had been required to establish the colony with little formal instruction from Britain and, until December 1831, was not able to use any local legislative power to support his administration of the government. While the audit and other financial administrative systems introduced by Stirling appear to have been either of his own making or in response to the changing resourcing capacity at his command as the colony developed, they appear to have operated effectively in managing the finances of the early colony. This framework included audit checks but was not separated from the executive -as was also the case in Britain. The lack of independence in each of the various Western
Australian colonial arrangements appears to have been considered acceptable. It is also reasonable to consider that including audit in the local administrative framework, in addition to being required to submit accounts and returns to the Imperial Colonial Audit Office, meant the position of Colonial Auditor was viewed as a fundamental part of good government administration-even if to merely provide a 'competent accounting function' for the executive.
Although Stirling was empowered to operate autocratically on a day-to-day basis, it seems that government appointees in the Swan River Colony operated as they were legislatively authorised to do -to 'make ordain and establish all such laws institutions and ordinances ... as may be necessary for the peace order and good government of his Majesty's subjects and others within the said settlements'. 48 The closely held senior positions within the Colony were monopolised by a few men, but it is likely this monopolisation occurred more because of the paucity of qualified personnel than because of any intent on the part of colonial officers to control public finances. The small coterie of skilled, hard-working and loyal officers in the colony probably did as much to ensure proper management as did the administrative system itself. Technically the systems were not strong, because the lack of separation of duties ensured that, if they had wanted to, these officers could have colluded to circumvent the system to their own advantage. But the powerful nineteenth-century concepts of personal honour and reputation, plus the close mutual monitoring required by the system, combined to operate effectively in providing assurancedespite lack of independence from executive government. It is evident that the 'few good men' of the Swan River Colony administration used the resources they had to effect sound financial management and to avoid loss through theft. (1996) . you that His Excellency expects from your zeal the performance of the services required of you without reward or remuneration beyond the satisfaction you will derive from the fulfilment of a duty of this confidential nature' (Bowyer, 1966:3) .
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